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ABSTRACT 
Malaysia is improving its electricity supply industry to become more transparent, 
productive and competitive with the introduction of the single buyer market model. 
However, since the electricity demand is lower than the reserved capacity, the 
implementation of this market model does not provide transparent competition as 
Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) has suffered massive profit erosion because of 
monthly capacity payment that should be paid to Independent Power Producers (IPP) 
regardless of electricity usage. Since 2005, the Malaysia Electricity Supply Industry 
(MESI) has planned to change to the pool market model as it is recognized as a 
model which could overcome the shortcomings of the single buyer market model. 
However, there are a few issues on introducing the pool model such as price 
fluctuation and market power exercises which could influence the welfare of 
generators as well as the consumers. Some researchers have developed pool-based 
market models with the aim to overcome the aforementioned issues, but the 
efficiency and the energy price offered from the generators are not considered. 
Therefore, this research developed a model introducing the minimum generation 
capacity payment involving the efficiency of the generators and base load sharing 
approaches. The proposed model was tested using the 2, 16 and 24 generator test 
systems involving IPPs and Tenaga Nasional Berhad Generation (TNBG) around 
Peninsular Malaysia for an economic analysis to highlight the merits of the proposed 
model in terms of generation revenue and demand payment. The results have shown 
that the proposed market model ensures the intermediate value of total generation 
revenue which decreased from 1.99% to 4.67% and 3% to 9.62% during the weekday 
and weekend, respectively. The demand payment decreased as it is proportional to 
the generation revenue. However, this proposed model did not consider market 
uncertainties. This findings can be applied for MESI and globally, in assisting and 
creating a new policy to achieve a better electricity market model. 
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ABSTRAK 
Malaysia sedang meningkatkan industri bekalan elektrik untuk mewujudkan 
persekitaran yang lebih telus, produktif dan berdaya saing dengan pengenalan model 
pasaran pembeli tunggal. Disebabkan permintaan elektrik yang lebih rendah 
berbanding kapasiti simpanan, pelaksanaan model pasaran ini tidak memberikan 
persaingan yang telus kerana Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) telah mengalami 
kerugian yang besar kesan pembayaran kapasiti bulanan kepada Pengeluar Tenaga 
Bebas (IPP) tanpa mengira penggunaan elektrik sebenar. Semenjak 2005, MESI 
merancang untuk bertukar ke model pasaran pool kerana menganggap model tersebut 
dapat mengatasi kelemahan pasaran pembeli tunggal. Terdapat beberapa isu dalam 
memperkenalkan model pool seperti turun naik harga dan penguasaan pasaran tenaga 
yang memberi kesan kepada penjana juga pengguna. Beberapa penyelidik telah 
membangunkan model berasaskan pasaran pool bertujuan untuk mengatasi isu-isu 
tersebut tetapi tidak mengambil kira kecekapan dan harga tenaga yang ditawarkan 
daripada penjana. Kajian ini mencadangkan model pasaran yang memperkenalkan 
bayaran penjanaan kapasiti minimum melibatkan kecekapan penjana dan 
perkongsian beban asas. Model yang dicadangkan diuji menggunakan 2, 16 dan 24 
sistem pengujian penjana yang melibatkan IPP dan Tenaga Nasional Berhad 
Generasi (TNBG) di sekitar Semenanjung Malaysia untuk analisis ekonomi bagi 
menunjukkan kelebihan model tersebut dari segi pendapatan penjanaan dan 
pembayaran permintaan. Keputusan menunjukkan jumlah keuntungan penjanaan 
model pasaran yang dicadangkan berada pada nilai pertengahan dengan peratus 
penurunan dari 1.99% kepada 4.67% pada hari bekerja dan 3% kepada 9.62% pada 
hujung minggu. Pembayaran permintaan menurun kerana berkadar langsung dengan 
keuntungan penjanaan. Model yang dicadangkan ini tidak mengambil kira 
ketidaktentuan dalam pasaran. Penemuan ini boleh digunakan oleh MESI dan global 
dalam mewujudkan dasar baharu untuk model pasaran elektrik yang lebih baik . 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The deregulation of electricity market is required to replace the vertically integrated 
utility which monopoly in selling and distribution of electricity into a more 
competitive market. Cost efficiency, the increased public awareness of the 
environmental impact of energy production, and the improved technological 
performance of peaking units, also the development of combined cycle gas turbines 
have been the drivers for the restructuring [1]. Therefore, the restructuring of 
electricity supply industry in developing countries has provide the consumers lower 
prices electricity and to open the market for competition by allowing the smaller 
players to get access to the electricity market by reducing the share of large state 
owned utilities.  As a matter of fact over various countries, there exists diversity in 
the wholesale electricity market operation. A transparent, open marketplace would 
encourage competition generators and reveal the inefficiencies of the current system 
to improve the efficiency of the electricity sector. 
 
1.1 Research Background 
 
In 1992, MESI took its first step towards becoming a competitive electricity market 
by introducing the Independent Power Producers (IPPs). The introduction of IPPs 
came after the national power outage in 1992 and a series of interruptions and 
rationing caused the government to conduct an immediate assessment of the nation‟s 
power generation industry [2]. During that time, the country was unable to cater for 
the growth in demand for power due to the rapid development of the national 
economy in the previous years. The IPPs‟ program is to restore an adequate safety 
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margin of power capacity and to ensure that it could meet the country‟s anticipated 
future power needs [3]. As a result, the government pushed forward the IPPs permit 
activity to break TNB's domination in the MESI, as well as to transfer the 
government-owned electricity utility‟s financial burden to build power plants. The 
introduction of IPPs and competitive bidding allowed for a level playing field in the 
generation sector. There is no competition in other areas as TNB fully controls the 
other aspects of the electricity business from transmission down to distribution and 
retail. The IPPs investments bring the implementation of a single buyer market 
model. 
The Power Purchased Agreements (PPA), which has lasted for 21 years, is 
signed by TNB and IPPs for the purpose of market risk protection [4]. The electrical 
energy is sold to TNB on a fixed rate based on the PPA, providing 70% of the 
nation‟s electricity demand. The first batch of IPPs granted licenses to build, operate 
and own power plants in Peninsular Malaysia. For instance YTL Power, Malakoff, 
Genting Sanyen Sdn. Bhd., Powertek Bhd and PD Power Sdn. Bhd. received 
between 18% and 25% internal rate of return as the PPAs were signed in 1993 and 
1994 for the first-generation IPPs, handled by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) 
[3]. YTL Power had the best deal with its first PPA with TNB, which was reported as 
being the only PPA that was based on a take-or-pay mechanism, where TNB had to 
take at least 75% of the electricity generated by YTL Power at a fixed price for a 
period of 21 years. This is a biased agreement because even if the former did not 
need the electricity, it would still need to pay compensation to YTL Power [2]. The 
second and third-generation PPAs were signed a few years later. For the first quarter 
of year 2014, 52.7% installed capacity was from TNB and 47.3% were produced by 
IPPs with fuel sources, 58% used gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG), 33% for coal 
and 9% for hydro and others [5]. As of December 2015, the installed generation 
capacity in Peninsular Malaysia was 20,710 MW, and the peak demand for 2015 as 
forecasted by TNB was at 16,901 MW [6].  
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Figure 1.1: Malaysia ESI reform 
 
The restructuring is supported by the existence of the Energy Commission 
(EC), which is an electrical regulator in Malaysia. EC is obliged to not only design 
an appropriate electricity market model, but also to set up suitable policies and 
regulation related to the electricity industry [2]. According to the Energy 
Commission Act 2001, the role of EC in the competitive bidding process is to 
promote and safeguard competition, and to enable fair and efficient market conduct 
or, in the absence of a competitive market, to prevent the misuse of monopoly or 
market power. In 2005, the MESI transformation program was launched which 
aimed to deliver a reliablility, transparency, efficiency and sustainability, where two 
points were highlighted under the industry‟s structure: competitive bidding and PPA 
renegotiation as shown in Figure 1.1 [7].  
Competitive bidding was introduced following by the government‟s decision 
for future generation capacity requirement to ensure independence, credibility and 
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transparency in procuring all new capacity requirements, which will include a price 
discovery mechanism that ensures only qualified parties will be tasked with the 
country‟s future electricity requirements [8]. The EC has been entrusted by the 
government to conduct the competitive bidding exercise since 2010 [3, 9].  
MESI had planned to change from a single buyer model to a wholesale 
market due to capacity payment in the single buyer model where the capacity 
payment was paid regardless of the energy usage to cover the fixed cost. During that 
time, the demand and reserve capacity gap were far different, which was almost 
50%. Consequently, TNB had to bear higher expenses for capacity payment due to 
the high reserve margine. However, this plan had been put on hold since 2005 
following the California crisis, and MESI had taken precautionary steps in the 
process of privatizing electricity. In order to carry out MESI‟s previous plan of 
restructuring, the pool-based market model could be applied as an alternative 
electricity market model as it accommodates fair competitive trading between power 
producers and power purchasers.  
Therefore, this research proposes novel generation pricing approaches for the 
pool-based market model. The aim of this research study is to improve the pool-
based market model which is useful for MESI to enhance efficiency, promote 
competition to lower costs, increase customer choice, assemble private investment 
and merge public finances. The proposed market model introduces the minimum 
generation capacity payment involving the efficiency of the generator and base load 
sharing approaches. This minimum generation capacity payment mechanism 
involves the efficiency of the generators to educate the IPPs to bid and sell their 
electricity produced at a lower price. Meanwhile, the base load sharing approach 
helps to reduce market power exercises and price fluctuations. The proposed model 
is compared with other pool-based models in three research cases to identify which 
market model is superior. This study also can be a reference to assist new policy set 
up. In this research, economic analysis is performed in terms of the generation of 
revenue and demand payment investigation, due to the pricing issue in the pool 
model by extending the capacity payment mechanism in the single auction power 
pool and generation adequacy. This is demonstrated without considering the 
transmission flow constraints. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The initial IPPs were awarded licenses to govern the construction, purchase and/or 
use of fuel, operation and selling of the energy produced under them for up to 21 
years [10]. In this agreement, TNB as the power off taker had agreed to pay two 
types of payment, which were energy and capacity payment. The energy payment is 
based on the electricity consumed by TNB, while the capacity payment, also known 
as availability payment, was paid monthly regardless of the electricity usage. This 
payment provides incentives for generators to be available at times when the system 
needs generation capacity and provide extra revenue to generators to cover the 
capital and other fixed costs which are not covered by the energy payment. However, 
due electricity demand being lower than the reserved capacity, TNB had suffered 
massive profit erosion because of capacity payment to IPPs. The cost of reserve 
capacity was borne by TNB, where the group bore RM 1.3 bilion spare capacity cost 
in financial year 2007 with a reserve margin at 45%. In 2008, the reserve margin was 
at 42% [6, 11]. Furthermore, after ten years of signing the PPAs, some IPPs had 
covered their capital and fixed cost. As a result, TNB as the power off taker has to 
bear high expenses and consumers also face risks as they depend on the current 
market situation. After passing several processes of evolution, the single buyer model 
is still a form of imperfect competition as there is only one buyer and many sellers of 
a product. The existing single buyer model does not provide any competition due to 
long-term PPAs, in which electricity trading only fall under one company, which is 
TNB transmission and distribution [12]. Therefore, a new market design is required 
so that TNB and IPPs receive reasonable profit and consumers pay an affordable 
price.  
In a perfect competition, all participants are price-takers and no participant 
can influence the market price unilaterally because theoretically, suppliers should bid 
at or very close to their marginal production costs to maximise return [13-15]. In 
2005, MESI aimed to change its structure to a wholesale market model [16]. In this 
research, the pool market model was proposed to carry out MESI‟s previous plan and 
overcome the drawbacks of the single buyer market model. However, there were a 
few issues of introducing the pool market model such as price fluctuation and market 
power exercises, which influenced the welfare of the generators. Consequently, the 
adoption of the pool market model in MESI will cause high cost IPPs to lose the 
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opportunity to be included in generation dispatch and eventually lose the revenue at 
low electricity demand. Conversely, the System Marginal Price (SMP) that cleared 
the market will become too high at peak electricity demand, providing excessive 
revenue for low cost IPPs. Therefore, some improvements should be made for the 
pool market model.  
Some researchers have developed an improved pool market model called the 
hybrid model. The hybrid model is a pool-based market model, which combines the 
pure pool market model and pro-rata base load profile where base load sharing is 
introduced. However, the developed hybrid model did not consider efficiency and the 
electricity price offered by the generators during base load sharing. This is because 
aging generators are not able to provide full available capacity due to low 
efficiencies, while some generators offer expensive electricity prices to gain more 
profits. As a result, energy buyers have to pay more for the electricity purchased due 
to full capacity payment and high energy prices. Theoretically, the base load power 
plants are designated based on their efficiency, low cost generation, and safety at 
rated output power levels. Thus, it is important to modify the existing pool model, so 
it can provide a fair market to the supplier and user.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives   
 
The aim of this research is mainly to improve the pool based electricity market 
model for MESI in a deregulated market environment, focusing on the economic 
benefits. In summary, this thesis addresses the following main objectives: 
(i) To solve unfair capacity payment in a single buyer model for MESI by 
proposing a new pool market model which incorporate the minimum 
generation payment mechanism and base load plant efficiency. 
(ii) To overcome the problem of high cost IPPs from losing the revenue at low 
electricity demand by synthesising the minimum generation capacity 
payment mechanism in the pool model. 
(iii) To validate the proposed market model by making a comparison with the 
spot market model applied by the Australian National Electricity Market 
(NEM) as a practical model from an economic view. 
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1.4 Scope of the Thesis  
 
This research focuses on the future recommended electricity market not limited to 
MESI only, but also to other countries which aim to develop a competitive market 
model to satisfy both power producers and purchasers. This can be achieved by 
considering and improving the properties of pool market in the proposed market 
model to solve the capacity payment problem in a single buyer model. The additional 
approach is added to modify the pool market for the future electricity market by 
introducing a minimum generation capacity payment mechanism to overcome the 
problem of losing revenue during low electricity demand for high cost IPPs. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure continuous remuneration of IPPs, the proposed 
market model considered the minimum generation payment mechanism with the base 
load plant efficiency and demand sharing approaches.  
The proposed market model is a single auction. The competition is only valid 
among generator companies, whereas customers do not know which generators 
succeeded in selling their output. The proposed market model was tested using two 
bus systems for conceptual analysis. Meanwhile, 16 and 24 generator test systems 
involving IPPs and Tenaga Nasional Berhad Generation (TNBG) around Peninsular 
Malaysia were tested for application analysis, which fully reflect the real situation in 
MESI. The parameters were taken into account; for instance, the load demand 
curves, the details of the MW installed capacity, energy prices, capacity prices, and 
efficiency of the generators were used for analysis in terms of generation revenue 
and demand payment. Considering the experience by the Australian National 
Electricity Market (NEM) in the pool market model, a comparison was carried out 
between the spot market model applied by the Australian NEM and the proposed 
market model from the view of the economic aspect. The MATLAB software was 
used to simplify the process of the analysis. The electricity trading that was 
considered was only up to the transmission level. Consequently, the business was 
only between the generators as the seller and distributor as the buyer or customers 
without taking into account the end user. 
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1.5 Significance of Research 
 
This research is conducted as the existing single buyer affects the TNB revenue as 
the power of the taker and also due to unfair market aspects. Meanwhile, future pool 
market models affect the revenue of expensive generators and demand payment for 
consumers. Therefore, this research work has presented an improvement in the pool 
market model approach as it can solve the capacity payment problem in the single 
buyer model which has burdened TNB and the demand side. For this proposed 
market model, the generators will receive reasonable payment or revenue based on 
the electricity‟s power that they had produced. It will also reduce the demand 
payment for a win-win situation to power producers and energy buyers. However, 
this research work is not limited to MESI only, but is for global use. Other 
contributions of this thesis are identified as follows: 
   
(i) To introduce the minimum generation capacity payment based on the 
generator‟s efficiency for the participated IPPs which have won the bidding 
competition as an incentive to educate the IPPs to bid and sell their electricity 
produced at a lower price. This approach enables the generators to compete 
for more dispatch and increase their revenues. 
(ii) To introduce a minimum generation capacity payment based on the generator 
efficiency for the non-participating IPPs which had lost in the bidding 
competition as compensation to ensure continuous remuneration for the IPPs 
regardless of their submitted energy bid prices and the fluctuating electricity 
demand. 
(iii) To introduce base load sharing demand among the generators involved. The 
efficiency and the price offered by the generators are taken into account. 
Therefore, the base load plant has equal opportunities to participate in the 
trading and receive revenue for their contribution. 
 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is organised in six chapters.  
Chapter 2 discusses the deregulated electricity market in brief, covering the before 
and after of the restructuring. In addition, the markets for electrical energy called 
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